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The Conservative European Reform Group is a 
body of 40 Conservative M. P. 's which aims to promote 
greater discussion within the Conservative Party on EEC 
issues, and to achieve major reforms. 
The Group has no funds and seeks none. Any 
profits made from the sale of publications will be donated to 
the Conservative Party, and any loss will be borne by the 
membership. 
At the 1981 Blackpool Conference, the Group 
invited two prominent politicians to give an address on the 
theme "EEC - is reform possible?" 
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IS REFORM POSSIBLE? 
by Christopher Tugendhat, Vice President of the Commission 
of the European Communities 
INTRODUCTION 
Is reform possible? That is the question about the 
European Community I have been asked to answer. My reply is 
Yes. The Community is a living political organism in a permanent 
state of change, renewal and flux. Sadly, many in Britain are so 
·obsessed with arguments about whether we should be in or out, and 
with those of its aspects that are unpopular in this country, that they 
fail to see either the speed or the extent of the evolution. 
Of course the pace varies from one aspect to another. This 
unevenness creates difficulties, as some policies move ahead faster 
than others, and some appear to make no progress at all. It is, 
in fact, a major cause of the budgetary imbalance that constantly 
bedevils Britain's relations with its partners and the need to act on 
both the general and the particular problem is now recognised by all 
Member Governments. 
They demonstrated this on May 30 last year, the day the 
crisis over the British budgetary contribution was brought to an end 
with a temporary agreement until something more permanent could 
be worked out. They did so by asking the Commission to undertake 
an examination of all the Community's policies, with the aim of 
preventing the recurrence of any further "unacceptable situationsu. 
The Commission, I am pleased to say, interpreted this mandate· 
widely and in June this year produced a far reaching report designed 
to provide a bas is on which the Community can be re-modelled for 
the 1980s and beyond. With such an ambitious objective the report 
covers a wide range of problems and policies and deals quite 
· specifically with the two issues - the British budgetary contribution 
and the Common Agricultural Policy - that cause most concern in 
this country. 
The fact that the member Governments in the Council of 
Ministers asked for the report, and the nature of the Commission's 
response, shows that the will to undertake the Community's reform 
is very much alive. The Governments, with the participation of the 
Commission, are now involved in detailed negotiations with the 
object of building a road over the territory surveyed by the Commission. 
I believe that rapid progress will be made. 
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It certainly)·;hould be. The West is facing the worst combina-
tion of economic and' strategic dangers since the 1930s and can ill 
afford disruption within the Community. The Member States should 
be working together to tackle the problems which affect them all, 
not squabbling over details. 
PROGRESS SO FAR 
As I have already indicated the best answer to the question 
I have been asked is the Community's record. Though uneven it 
shows that reform and self-renewal are going on all the time. 
The most obvious change has been in the membership of the 
Community itself, In 1973 the original Six expanded to Nine with the 
adhesion of Britain, Denmark and Ireland, This year Greece 
arrived, Negotiations are now in progress with Spain and Portugal 
designed to lead to a further expansion to Twelve within the lifetim~ 
of this Commission and, I hope, with the minimum of delay, 
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Greece, Spain and Portugal were all until recently under 
dictatorships, They are among the few countries anywhere in the 
world in recent years to have exchanged that form of government for 
democracy. It is significant that on their return to freedom one of 
their first acts was to apply for Community membership, fu their 
view it is essential if they are to be part of the mainstream of 
Western European affairs, 
The Community institutions have also changed at a pace 
that would have amazed the reformers of the 19th century heyday of 
British constitutional development, There are examples of both 
evolution and innovation, 
The European Parliament has eyolved first through the 
acquisition of important budgetary powers, then through direct 
elections, In Britain those elections did not attract much attention, 
But we should not allow our own passivity to blind us to the historic 
nature.-6f an election involving people of nine different nationalities 
voting on party rather than national lines, Many of those who 
participated fought against each other during the war, I doubt 
whether in 1945 any of them would have dreamed that such an election 
could be possible. It would have seemed utopian, 
The outstanding example of innovation is the European 
Council, the thrice yearly meeting of Hea:ds of State and Government, 
It was not forseen in the Treaty and dot;.a not feature in what might be 
termed the "Sacred Texts" of the Community. But the Presidents and 
Prime Minis.ters felt a need for it and it emerged, Now it has ~ 
central role to play in resolving disputes and pointing the way ahead, 
It also provides an occasion for its members to exchange ideas on 
common problems and to work out common positions on a wide rapge 
of ¥1ternal and external matters, ' 
i Similar progress has been made in certain major fields of 
acti\\ity as well, The European Monetary System (EMS) and 
Political Co-operation, as the procedure for working together and 
co-ordinating positions in foreign policy is called, are the two most 
notable examples, · 
B:htain unfortunately decided not to become a full member 
of the EMS at the outset, preferring instead a sort of 12th man 
status, neither really in nor entirely out, At that time, in late 1978 
and early 1979, it was argued that the disciplines of membership 
would prevent sterling from falling. In fact, without the benefit of 
the EMS constraints which are designed to secure stable exchange 
rates with orderly parity changes when necessary, sterling went 
through the roof, The opponents of EMS quickly turned their 
original arguments on their head and despite the change of 
government in June 1979, Britain has continued in its anomalous 
position, 
The facts speak for themselves. Outside the EMS 
exchange rate arrangements, the core of the system, British 
industry has suffered grievously from fluctuating exchange rates. 
Sterling rose too far too fast at first and since then has begun to 
arouse concern that it might now fall too sharply. By contrast the 
EMS countries have enjoyed remarkable stability both by 
comparison with before the system started and with those currencies 
outside, Changes have occurred but they have been carried through 
in an orderly fashion, Throughout this period sterling has of 
course been subject to special pressures as a result of its petro-
currency status, These have undoubtedly made the fluctuations 
worse. But by the same token it is even more regrettable that it 
has not had the backing and assistance of the EMS disciplines and 
procedures. 
The EMS will face further tests. The longer the US 
pursues a high interest rate policy, the worse the consequences will 
be for o.ther currencies. Divergencies between French and German 
economic policies could also cause problems. So too could the ' 
enormous public sector and balance of payments deficits for some 
of the smaller Member States. · 
The greater EMS's difficulties, the more those who wanted 
Britain to stay in the pavilion rather than fully participate in the 
system will crow. But they will be wrong: the greater the difficul-
ties, the stronger the arguments for full British membership. The 
British economy is as much touched by the consequences of US 
interest rate policy as those of its Community partners within the 
EMS. Britain should therefore be co-operating fully with them to 
form a common front to represent Europe's views in Washington 
and to intervene in the exchange markets. Nor should Britain 
forget that stable international exchange rates with orderly movements 
when necessary are of a major national interest. Britain could 
only lose, it has nothing to gain if anything goes wrong with the 
EMS. To maintain this interest and to enable EMS to continue its 
useful work, Britain needs to be a full member. · 
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Britain alto has a considerable stake in the success of 
EMS 1s aim on bringing about a greater co-ordination of economic 
policy. The other members of the Community now constitute by 
far Britain •s largest export market, accounting for some 43% of 
total British sales abroad. Germany alone now buys more British 
goods than the US. The Community is also a market in which 
Britain has been more successful than others. Over the last eight 
years our exports to the other members have grown twice as fast 
as our exports to the rest of the world and in 1980 we had for the 
first time a trading surplus of some £700m, even without taking 
invisibles into account. Industrial structures, marketing operations 
and patterns of investment, both within and outside the Community, 
are increasingly geared to the needs of this vast market. As a 
result, British jobs and profits are directly touched by the decisions 
of our Community partners, and it is in Britain's interests to 
strengthen the procedures for co-ordinating their policies. 
In Political Co-operation, unlike EMS, Britain has been 
active and constructive since joining the Community. 
This too is a good example of the Community's ability to 
innovate in response to changing circumstances. There is nothing 
about it in the Treaty. It derives from what is now known as the 
Luxembourg Report of 1970, since when it has grown like Topsy. 
Perhaps the best way to desci:ibe Political Co-operation 
is as a process whereby Ministers and officials from Member 
States engage in continuous consultations on foreign policy through 
regular meetings and a special network of confidential telegrams. 
The object is to co-operate and to co-ordinate to the maximum degree 
and if possible to act in common. In all Member State capitals, 
Ministers and officials now instinctively think in European rather 
than national terms on a growing number of foreign policy issues. 
Dougla-B Hurd has described it as "the biggest change in diplomatic 
method" since he joined the Foreign Office in 1952. 
The results are impressive. Political Co-operation's 
first major success was in preparing for the opening in 1973 of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Since 
then on the long journey from Helsinki to Belgrade and Madrid, the 
Community countries have maintained a .common approach. Indeed, 
they have provided the motor for policy.development on the Western 
side. Without this solid core, it is un1ikely that such a high degree 
of overall Western solidarity could have been sustained or that the 
success, limited though it may be, which has been achieved in-the 
negotiations, could have been reached. 
. More recently the European Community has launched a 1 
di~tinctive initiative on the Middle East, as a .:omplement to Carhp 
David, and maintained it at a tim~ when the American resolve in 
that area has sometimes seemed to falter. Had this not happened, 
I w6nder whether even the most responsible Arab Governments 
would have been able to maintain those good relations with the West 
which are so much in the interests of both sides. Last year the 
countries of the Community acted in common in imposing economic 
sanctions on Iran over the detention of the American hostages. More 
recently 't\tey have presented a plan inspired by Lord Carrington for 
ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. They hav~ also taken 
various economic and political measures in support of Poland. 
Against this background it is not surprising that governments 
outside Europe make increasingly less distinction between the 
positions of individual Member States and increasingly ask "What are 
Europe's intentions and what will Europe do? 11 Together Europe 
makes a contribution to international peace and stability and to 
safeguarding the interests of its members that no individual European 
country can begin to approach. 
But the procedures are still sometimes too cumbrous and 
Europe does not always respond as quickly or decisi_vely as the 
times require. That is why. in his Hamburg speech m 1980, Lord 
Carrington put forward an important three point plan to strengthen 
the organisation of Political Co-operation, to deepen the degree of 
co-operation and to speed up its ability to respond to crises. 
The German Foreign Minister, Herr Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, has suggested that Political Co-operation should be 
further developed so as to cover discussion of security questions. 
I strongly believe that we should go down that road. As the 
President of the Commission, Monsieur Gaston Thorn, bas 
recently said "The over-simplified separation of economic policy 
and defence is absurd". When the Community was being formed and · 
in its early days, such founding fathers as .Jean Monnet and Paul-
Henri Spaak, who indeed went on to become Secretary-General of 
NA TO, were equally interested in both. 
I believe that the Community will move in this direction 
and on two levels. Firstly, the accounting cost in real terms of 
defence equipment will lead to increasing pressure for the better 
co-ordination of defence equipment and procurement policies and 
for the establishment of a genuinely open Community market 
within which firms can achieve a level of c:ost effectiveness and 
creativity comparable to that of the US. Secondly, it is inevitable 
that within the overall framework of the North Atlantic Alliance 
there will be particular European interests and concerns that 
should be articulated within a Community framework. Beyond the 
NATO area there are already problems, of which the Middle East 
is the most obvious, that concern Europe's vital interests and to-
wards the solution of which we as a Community should make a 
distinctive contribution. More are likely to arise in the future. 
Because Political Co-operation has no formal rules and 
rests on a voluntary basis, it is sometimes suggested in Britain 
that the United Kingdom could remain a participant after leaving the 
Community. That is a delusion. It could not be done. Political 
Co-operation cannot be separated from the more formal 
,·: 
institutional obligatidn's imposed by the Treaty. It depends for its 
' existence on the particular intimacy, the continuous contacts and the 
sense of common purpose engendered by the Community. Moreover, 
rather like the House' of Commons in session and when the 
Committee stage of a Bill is being taken on the floor of the House, 
it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between the Ten acting in 
Political Co-operation and the Community. The way in which the 
Iranian and Polish questions have been handled, to name only two, 
shows this very clearly o • 
Another area in which the Comm·mity has demonstrated 
its ability to change, evolve and reform from within, is in its 
relations with the developing countries, Taken together, the 
Community countries constitute the world's largest aid donor, 
providing 39% of the total compared with 25% from the US and a 
miserly 1. 4% from the Soviet Union, The Lome Convention, an 
agreement between some 60 developing countries in Africa, the , 
Caribbean and the Pacific, has been described by Lord Carrington 
as "the most advanced and ambitious partnership now in existence 
between industrialised and developing countries", More than half 
of those members are in the Commonwealth and one of the first 
acts of the newly independent Zimbabwe was to apply for member-
ship, 
Britain has always prided itself that it would provide a 
bridge between Europe and those parts·of the world with which it has 
special historic ties, The Lome Convention provides the best means 
of doing soo Nothing we or any other individual European Country 
could do on our own cou,ld provide a similarly powerful, attractive 
force for countries like 'Zimbabwe on the edge of the Soviet sphere of 
influence. 
WHERE MORE PROGRESS IS NEEDED 
Enlargement, institutions, relations with the rest of the 
.world - all provide ample evidence to support my answer Yes, to 
the question "Is Reform Possible?" It has and is taking place, and 
ideas for significant new developments are on the table, some from 
British sources, But there have been disappointments as well, As 
I have already said, the pace of change varies from :me aspect of 
Comm'lnity affairs to another and in some is excessively slow, As 
I .also said, this is itself a major caus'e of difficulty, Hence the 
Council of Ministers' request last year to the Commission to come 
up with ideas for the futurep and the Commission's response in 
June. Hence too the negotiations that are now in progress and about 
the outcome of which I have already expressed optimism, 
. ' 
l The disappointments fall into two categories, Firstly, :there 
is \the failure to develop more comm'.)n policies commonly financed 
thrpugh the Budg~t. As a result the Community Budget is still 
dop1.inated by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the flow of 
funds bctwocn .:\IemLer States which it generates is a fundamental 
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cause of the British budgetary problem, Secondly, there is the failure 
to respond sufficiently to new challenges in the mainstream of 
Community, activities, both in respect of common policies commonly 
financed and•in other ways not necessarily involving expenditure at 
Community level, 
In neither sphere is the record as bad as it is sometimes 
painted. Since 1978 the Regional and Social Funds have grown 
annually by 30% compared with 12% for agriculture, In 1981 the 
Community Budget is providing some £1, 650m for this purpose, 
This is far too little to have more than a marginal effect on the 
problems or to reflect a real desire for joint Community actions, 
Nonetheless the rate of progress is not negligibleo Moreover the 
Community is also making more use of its ability to tap the 
international capital markets and to on-lend in the Member Stateso 
This year some £2, 200m will be made available from that source 
to augment the Regional and Social Fund spending, 
In the industrial sector the Community has provided a 
common response to the steel crisis, The British Goverment, the 
British Steel Corporation and the steel unions were among those who 
in 1980 pressed most strongly for the first ever declaration of a state 
of "Manifest Crisis" under which the Commission was given un-
precedented powers to organise the market on a European basis, In 
June this year a second stage of the recovery plan was agreed in the 
Council of Ministers, aimed at restoring a free market and phasing 
out national aids by 1985. On behalf of the British Government, 
Norman Tebbit has said "We could not have solved unilaterally the 
problems of the British steel industry, The only way they could have 
been solved would have been in the context of Western Europe and I 
cannot imagine how that could have been done without the EEC". 
Despite this success, industrial co-operation seems too 
often to be viewed like a visit to the dentist - unwelcome and to be 
postponed until there is no alternative 0 In the positive development 
of those industries - both high technology and more conventional ~ on 
which the employment and living standards of all European peoples 
will in future depend, we have so far failed to achieve the degree of 
co-operation necessary, or to exploit the opportunities of a European-
wide market, The result is bad for us all, Acting individually the 
European countries are falling behind their major external 
industrial competitors and face a real prospect of a disastrous 
decline in which they are squeezed between advanced industrial 
countries such as the US and Japan on the one hand and the newly 
industrialised countries who can now produce more competitively 
the goods on which our past success was built .on the other, 
In energy too there is a long way to go. This is 
quintessentially an issue on which we face common problems and 
need a common response, There should at the very least be a 
framework of agreements covering crisis management, energy-
sa v ing- and the twin problems of the diversification of suppl'ies and 
' 
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the development of new energy sources, None of these exist, We 
do ~ot even have a common approach to energy pricing, a point 
which has caused considerable concern to British industrial 
consumers in recent months, 
In Britain, however, most attention has been paid to the 
Community's failure to grasp the nettle of bringing the CAP up-to-
date, The CAP has become a bete noire in this country, Because 
it dominates the Community Budget, owing to the failure to develop 
other internal policies in areas such as those I have just been 
talking about, it is not generally appreciated that it accounts for only 
some 0, 5% of Community GDP, Its success in providing plentiful 
and reliable supplies of food at a time when many parts of the world 
are suffering from shortage is taken for granted, So too is the 
contribution it has made to social and political stability on the 
Continent, although that is in the British interest just as much as 
our stability is in the interest of other European countries, Its ' 
surpluses are justifiably attacked, but it should be remembered 
that they provided the means by which the Community was able to 
provide quick and much-needed help to Poland. 
~onetheless, though the principles and objectives of the 
Community are sound, the way in which it works needs to be brought 
up-to-date, The nub of the matter is that prices have been set at a 
level which encourages over-production and there is no limit on the 
-· authorities' obligation to buy in at guaranteed prices that proportion 
of the total output that cannot be sold commercially. This in turn has 
led to the creation of a mass of arrangements f9r disposing of the 
surpluses, which add still further to the cost of the CAP and some of 
which create political difficulties and distortion on world markets as 
well, 
,,,. The Commission has been aware of these proplems (or a 
long time. Each year since I have been in Brussels it has brought 
forward proposals to moderate the rate of cost increase to curb· 
production of wastef.ul surpluses and to tackle the miderlying 
problems, Sometimes they have been more radical, sometimes less 
so. If even the more modest had been accepted, the Community 
would not be facing the difficulties it does today. 
But each year the Council of Agriculture Ministers has 
unanimously gutted the Commission'~,-proposals. Each Minister has 
been so concerned to secure benefits for his own particular interest 
groups that the longer term cost of the Agriculture Council's 
decisions has never received as much attention as it should. 'in 
t~at spirit they have exchanged concessions which over the years 
qave grossly inflated the Community Budget. 1 
l It is for this reason more than any other that the Com~unity 
is mow approaching the limit of its financial own resources. It is 
I believe, also for this reason more than any other that doubts ' 
exist about its ability to reform itself, despite the successes 
which have been achieved in other fields, 
I 
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In fact, of course, the threat of financial crisis is a 
powerful instrument of reform. Because of it the Community quite 
literally cannqt go on as it is. Already the margin between what it 
spends and what is available to it (from customs duties agriculture 
levies and the 1% VAT charge) is so small that everything non- · 
agricultural is being severely constrained, In particular, there is 
no chance of developing new initiatives in industry, energy and 
transport, for instance, beyond the prototype stage. 
If the limit is reached, both the CAP and other existing 
polic.ies will be disrupted, New financial own resources can only 
be made available with the agreement of the national Parliaments 
of all the Member States, and it is a political fact that this will not 
be forthcoming in the present situation, Thus the negotiators now 
'working on the basis of the Commission's report have not only the 
carrot of creating a Community for the 80 1s and beyond; they also 
have the stick of a financial crisis if they fail, 
. Quite apart from this powerful consideration, the 
Community is at last focusing on a whole range of inter-related 
problems instead of tackling them piecemeal, The Commission's 
paper contains ideas on CAP reform, the problems of the 
Mediterranean, the Regional and Social Funds, industry, energy, 
the further development of the Common Market itself, a Budget 
mechanism to limit the British contribution, and new financial own 
resources. Agriculture, therefore, will no longer be }ust a matter 
of trade-offs between Agriculture Ministers, The British budgetary 
problems will be settled in the context of Community problems as 
a whole, The granting of new own resources, which will certainly 
be necessary if the Community is to be carried forward, can be 
justified by the reforms made in existing practices and the proposals 
that are agreed concerning present and future policies. 
This framework is far more conducive to success than when 
individual policies are dealt with on their own J:>y the spec·ialist , . 
ministers concerned, as has hitherto been the case with agriculture. 
It is also more likely to bring forward amicable agreements than · 
apparently straightforward negotiations on a single clear. issue, 
such as a budgetary contribution, between one country and the rest 
or even between two groups of countries. Such negotiations are all 
· too likely to become trials of strength in which one participant has 
more t~ gain. or lose than the other. When several issues involving 
the national mterests of all concerned are simultaneously on the 
table, as at present, everyone has an incentive to succeed. 
Britain's interest, and it is necessary that British public 
opinion should understand this, is to conduct tlie negotiations on 
this basis, The British negotiators must not give the impression 
that they are concerned only with the budgetary contribution 
important as that is. If they do, others will be reluctant to ~ake 
concessions on that issue, The other EEC members need to be 
convinced that Britain is as committed to the Community as ~ whole 
as they are, and concerned with all aspects of its development. It 
I',!·, 
1. 
is in any case in Britain's interest to proceed on this basis, as a 
negotiation involving a wide range of issues provides it as a late-
comer with one of the best opportunities it has ever had to influence 
the way the Community evolves in the future. 
I feel on strong 1rround in saying this because on the two 
issues that most worry British public opinion - the CAP and the 
British budgetary contribution - I believe the Commission's paper 
rises to the challenge. On agriculture its recommendations include 
bringing internal Community prices more into line with world 
prices, production targets and limiting the guarantee to support 
the market, improved quality control and tighter financial manage-
ment, and a stricter discipline in relation to national aids. 
The paper also faces up to the problems created for , 
Britain by the combination of the way in which the CAP works with 
the absence of other policies generating substantial offsetting 
flows of funds, It states unequivocally that "Community solidarity 
demands that a remedy· be found to this inequitable situation" and 
goes on to propose a specific budgetary mechanism to achieve thato 
In essence the mechanism involves comparing the United 
Kingdom's share of the Community's GDP with the proportion it 
obtains through agricultural guarantee expenditure. On the basis of 
this calculation, the United Kingdom would receive a repaymento In 
the Commission's view it should be "fairly high". But the precise 
amount or percentage of the United Kingdom deficit which it would 
cover is one of the principal matters to be decided in the present 
negotiations. I believe that the proposed mechanism, if adopted, 
would go far towards solving the British budgetary problem, although, 
depending upon the amount involved, an auxiliary measure might also 
be needed. But whether the Member States, including the United 
Kingdom, decide to adopt this mechanism as it stands, to modify it 
or to choose a different one, the principle enunciated by the 
Commission is of great importance to the United Kingdom. It should 
also convince British {Xlblic opinion that its natural concern over the 
British budgetary contribution is understood in Brussels, 
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF WITHDRAWAL 
Is reform possible, I was ask~d'; I have given my answer 
and explained the reasons for ito But what if Britain should follow 
the Labour Party's prescription and leave the Community? That 
possibility too must be examined when one considers the question of 
the Community's reform. 
. At b·est, the European Community would simply go on 
without us, It would of course be distracted by the de-negotiations, 
when .it should be ·concentrating on improving existing policies and 
finding new ways to tackle common problems. In the long term it 
would also be weakened by the loss, both actual and potential, of 
all that Britain could do for the common cause. But the Community 
iJ 
prospered before Britain joined and it should be assumed that it 
could remain ll- major force after Britain's departure. It is in the 
interests of democracy and freedom that it should. 
In this scenario the main victim of British withdrawal 
would be Britain itselio At present British industry competes on 
equal terms with its European rivals in the Community which, as 
I have already pointed out, is by far the largest export market for 
British goods o This is partly because there are no tariff barriers 
and partly because the British Government has an equal say with 
the rest in setting the rules that govern standards and the terms of 
competitiono After withdrawal tariffs would be introduced against 
British goods and the British Government would lose that right. 
•British exporters would consequently be put at a massive dis-
advantage. In its recent policy statement the Labour Party's 
National Executive Committee (NEC) recognised that "some of our 
products would face high tariffs and have only restricted access to 
EEC markets". This self-inflicted loss would not be compensated 
for by new opportunities elsewhere and huge numbers of jobs would 
be put at risko 
This would not be the only blow to Britain's employment 
prospects. The country would also find it much harder to attract 
new industrial investmmto At present one quarter of all such 
investment comes from abroad, most of it because we are part of 
the Community's tariff-free market of nearly 300 million consumers. 
A plant in Britain can therefore be used to supply the whole EEC 
without "let or hindrance". Following withdrawal that would cease 
to be possible. As a result some companies would run down their 
existing operations and the flow of new investment would drastically 
diminish. ~obs and job prospects would suffer accordingly. 
At the same time Britain would no longer be part of 
Political Co-operation. It would lose the chance to join the EMS and 
so to enhance its ability to influence the economic policy of its . 
major trading partners. It would have to leave the Lome Convention 
and so lose one of its best links with the developing countries. 
Finally, it would deny itseli the right to participate in whatever 
new edifices are built on these foundations in future 0 
· At a time when international relations in every sphere are 
dominated by countries much larger than Britain and by powerful 
groups of countries, Britain would be sacrificing the right to play 
a prominent part in .one of these groups. It is not too much to say 
that this would be an act of self-abnegation unparallelled in our 
histo,ry o 
Yet that is the least bad scenario; that Britain will harm 
only itseli. Other possibilities exist as well. 
The worst is that British withdrawal from the Commwiity 
could turn out to be the first step towards unravelling the whole· 
delicate structure of economic co-operation in the W est 0 The 
National Executive Committee of the Labour Party has said it 
would be accompanied by the imposition of protectionist trade 
barriers• and we know that some prominent members of that party 
are aiming at a siege economy. In any case Britain would be 
placing itself at such a disadvantage in international trade relations 
by withdrawing that any government that did so would find it hard 
not to be dragged down that road. This would be a significant 
international event. One of the largest trading nations• arid one 
with all the advantages of energy independence, would be taking the 
lead in restoring international trade barriers. Not since 1945 would 
the open trading system on which the West's economy is based 
have suffered such a blow. 
The Community• one of the strongest upholders of that 
system, would be weakened and distracted. Its disciplines might 
not hold. There would be strong pressures in the US and other 
industrial countries to retaliate against whatever Britain did. If 
one of their major.markets was being closed, it would be argued• 
why should their industries have to suffer competition from British 
exports? First one, then a rush of other countries might feel 
obliged to take countervailing action. As a fire devours the forest, 
although the careless person who started it intended no such thing, 
so too could the central feature of the post-war Western economic 
system be swept away. 
As we know only too well from previous epochs, there is 
a direct link between the sort of close political and defence arrange-
ments that at present characterise the West ·and the economic 
system that underpins them. If the latter is removed, the former 
will be threatened. 
. Perhaps the worst would not happen. Let us hope that 
other-countries would display more wisdom and statemanship than 
Britain if it decided to withdraw from the Community. But what a 
risk to run, and whatever the outcome, Britain would be damaged. 
How much better to work for the success of the European 
Community. That is where our interests lie and that is the way we 
can do most.good for ourselves and the world as a whole. Those who 
would take us out would not only reduce'Britain's ability to influence 
the economic• political and strategic ,,realities of the world in which 
we would continue to have to live. They would also deal a blow at 
the capability of the West to tackle the problems that now beset us. 
Not since Chamberlain's Government ignored Churchill's warnings 
in the 1930's would a British Government have committed such a 
historic error. · 
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